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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between income smoothing and CEO tenure on 
a sample of 271 U.S companies over the period 1993 to 2003. Moreover, in order to test the extent of 
income smoothing for job security and specifically for a lengthen tenure; we also have considered some 
CEOs characteristics such as age and tenure. Empirical results of Wilcoxon statistics and discriminating 
analysis show that when the current (future) performance is good, the CEOs find the sufficient margins to 
manage the earnings to leave in reserve for the future performance (or borrow for the current 
performance). In addition, the results  of the multivariate model  show that the CEO smooth the income 
by decreasing accruals, so they shift current earnings to future periods when current earnings is high and 
future earnings is low to lengthen their tenure.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last three decades, earning management has been the subject of considerable researches in the 
accounting literature. One of the most important questions that have attracted a lot of interest in earning 
management concerns the relationship between job security and income smoothing. Nowadays, there are 
some consensus between researchers that CEOs’ smooth income in order to maximize their expected 
length of tenure, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), DeFond and Park (1997), Boyer and Molina (2006), 
and Ahmed, Lobo and Zhoo (2001). Empirical evidence show that CEOs’ use the flexibility allowed in the 
generally accepted accounting procedures or using IFRS to smooth income, see for example, Gaver et al. 
(1995), and DeFond and Park (1997). Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) suggest that executives engage in 
earning smoothing because of concerns about conserving their positions or avoiding dismissal. DeFond 
and Park (1997) find that CEO of firms having poor (good) performance in the current period and 
expected good (poor) performance in the next period choose income-increasing (income-decreasing) 
discretionary accruals in order to reduce the threat of dismissal. Ahmed et al. (2001) find evidence for the 
hypothesis following that income smoothing is greater when managers’ job security concerns are more 
severe. The authors use some firm characteristics supposed to imply greater job security concerns for 
managers. 
 
Recently, Zhang (2009) deduces that at the starting of their tenures and for building reputation of ability 
the CEOs are incited to inflate earnings. Moreover, Zhang (2009) show also after establishing their good 
reputations through their long tenures; the COE’s behave less aggressively in order to protect their 
reputations. Hazarika et al. (2011) show that a CEO’s tenure is negatively related to how earnings are 
managed during his term in office. They find that earnings management decreases after a CEO forced 
departure. They show also that the relation between earnings management and forced turnover occurs 
both in firms with good and bad performance, this paper contributes to the empirical literature in this 
field by examining the link between job security and income smoothing. Specially, we investigate whether 
there is a significant link between tenure and income smoothing. To do that, we follow the same line as 
DeFond and Park (1997) in measuring pre-amenaged earning. Our study differs from the Defond and 
Park (1997) work on the manner of testing the relation between the income smoothing and job security. 
Moreover, in contrast to Ahmed et al. (2001)1, in a work we have introduced some social variables such 
as age (1), age (2) and tenure. Indeed, Weishbach (1988), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), and Paquerot 
(1996) found a significant relation between the CEO turnover and their age. To do that, we have 
                                                          
1 Ahmed et al. (2001) examine the relation between income smoothing and three proxies for job security: 
competition, product durability and revenue volatility. 
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introduced the variable, age (1), for seeking, if the CEO age have a significant impact on tenure by 
stimulating income smoothing. In the other hand, Goyal and Parck (2001) suggest that around the age of 
65 years the majority of the departures are voluntary. Thus, we introduced this variable, age (2), to assess 
whether the CEOs persists in their office around retirement age. The results of Goyal and Parck (2001) 
show that a long tenure is associated with a CEO age close to the retirement age. Alternately, a CEO with 
long tenure can build a base of power.  
 
Empirical results indicate that discretionary accruals can discriminate between the firms experiencing 
good current (future) performance and firms experiencing bad current (future) performance. 
Furthermore, the results of the discrimination analysis show that job security variables are not 
significant. This result must be carefully taken, because the average of the tenure in both groups’ good 
current (future) performance and bad current (future) performance is almost the same, which 
approaches 10 years. Our multivariate analysis proves also that CEOs engage in earnings decreasing 
accruals in order to lengthen their tenure, and thus by shifting current earnings to future periods when 
current earnings is high and future earnings is low. This result confirms our hypotheses and aligns them 
with the intuition of Fudenberg and Tirole (1995). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviews empirical literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 explains the research 
design and describes the sample selection criteria. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, 
Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
The CEO’s career concerns: Fama (1980) suggests that explicit incentive contracts do not motivate CEOs 
since a CEO can be disciplined through career concern based implicit incentives. His arguments that the 
careers concerns reduce agency problems between the CEOs and the shareholders. Gibbons and Murphy 
(1990) affirm that the careers concerns are more important when the CEOs are farther the retirement 
age. They documented that older CEOs' cash compensation is more sensitive to their firms' performance, 
consistent with older executives being more motivated by explicit rather than career concern around 
retirement age. However, Brickley et al. (1999) argue that careers concerns do not take end at the 
retirement age. Indeed many CEOs serve on their own or other boards after retirement (Lee, 2007; Song 
and Thakor, 2006). They notice that the retired CEOs became more common on boards. Empirical 
evidence indicates that the careers concerns decrease when CEOs use the flexibility afforded under 
current GAAP to manipulate earning, as well as prolonging their tenure (Dechow and Sloan, 1991; 
Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Koch and Wall, 2000) or affecting the decisions of investment (Song and 
Thakor 2006).  
 
The CEO’s opportunism and the earning management: Lambert (1984) suggests that optimal 
contracting with risk adverse managers can generate smoothing which is considered as one earning 
management scheme. He describes smoothing in a two-period moral hazard setting where the optimal 
contract has second-period managerial compensation increasing in first-period output. Thus, when first-
period performance is good, the marginal utility of consumption in the second period is low for the 
manager, and he reduces effort. Healy and Wahlen (1998) attribute the opportunistic character to the 
earning management. This approach was tested by several empirical studies. Godfrey, Mather and 
Ramsay (2001) argue that new CEOs have incentives both to manage earnings and to engage in 
impression management by manipulating the impressions created by graphs in financial reports. In the 
year of CEO change, they find evidence of downward earnings management but no evidence of any 
unfavorable impression management of the key financial variables graphed. As posited, they find 
evidence of upward earnings management and favorable impression management in the year after a CEO 
change. These results are strongest for the sub-sample where the CEO change was due to a resignation 
rather than a retirement. This result confirms that the new CEOs are opportunistic making a big bath, 
which is in line with the results of Murphy and Zimmerman (1993).  
 
Chen and Cheng (2002) find that the abnormal accrual-based anomaly is correlated with CEOs 
incitements to record abnormal accruals. Future returns are negatively associated with abnormal 
accruals recorded for opportunistic earnings management purposes. These results suggest that investors’ 
failure to distinguish CEO’s incitements to record abnormal accruals provides an explanation for the 
abnormal accrual-based anomaly. This failure lets CEOs engaging in opportunistic earnings management, 
and thus hinders CEO’s ability to communicate private information to the stock market via abnormal 
accruals. The authors conclude that for opportunistic earnings management purposes, CEOs record 
97 
 
abnormal accruals, such as hiding poor performance or postponing the recognition of good performance, 
in order to maximize their utility with no intention to disclose private information. CEOs have incentives 
to hide poor performance because their wealth, reputation, and job security are positively affected by 
earnings (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995; Weishbach 1988). Ahmed, Lobo and Zhoo (2001) show that when 
current performance is good and future performance is expected to be bad, CEOs of firms operating in 
competitive industries, in durable goods industries, and in more uncertain operating environments 
engage significantly more negative discretionary accruals consistent with greater magnitude of income 
smoothing. Furthermore, they note that when current performance is low and future performance is 
expected to be high, CEOs of firms operating in durable goods industries and in more uncertain operating 
environments engage significantly more positive discretionary accruals consistent with a greater 
magnitude of income smoothing. Demers and Wang (2010) prove that younger CEOs engage less income-
increasing accruals, by about 1% of total assets, than older CEOs. In addition, they find that younger 
managers engage less income increasing real activities. 
 
Earning management and CEO departure: The US context is generally consistent with incoming CEOs 
‘taking a bath’ (De-Angelo, 1988; Elliott and Shaw, 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Pourciau, 1993). 
De-Angelo (1988) detects that well CEOs manipulate earnings downwards in the year of the takeover and 
communicate higher earnings the following year. This is used to maintain their claims of being better 
CEOs. Elliott and Shaw (1988) find that 39% of their sample had known CEO change in the period of the 
write-off. Their evidence confirms the affirmation that new CEOs seek to impute poor results to their 
predecessors. In an important study on managerial horizon problems, Dechow and Sloan (1991) certify 
that CEOs have opportunistic behavior, so they boost earnings during their final years in office by 
reducing R&D expenditures. They concentrate on firms in R&D-intensive industries and demonstrate that  
expenditure in R&D are significantly lower in a CEO’s terminating year and year of departure, showing 
that CEOs with short horizons accomplish value-decreasing  decisions in order to enhance current 
earnings. Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) conclude that decreases in R&D, advertising, capital 
expenditures, and accounting accruals are better explained by the bad performance of the firm than by 
leaving CEOs practicing discretion. They show that incoming CEOs take a big bath in the year of change.  
 
Similarly, Demers and Wang (2010) declare that aged CEOs are associated with low discretionary 
expenditures in R&D relative to their younger counterparts. They deduce that aged CEOs are more likely 
than younger CEOs to engage in real transaction manipulation. Pourciau (1993) separates between 
voluntary and forced CEO’s turnover. She suggests that there are serious motivations and opportunities 
for earnings management in the case of forced turnover. From a sample of 73 CEO changes in the US, 
Pourciau (1993) proves empirical evidence consistent with her hypothesis that arriving CEOs manipulate 
accruals in a way that declines earnings in the year of change and enhances earnings in the following year. 
Further, her evidence shows that the arriving CEOs recorded large write-offs in the year of the change. 
Pourciau (1993) reveals that the evidence is also consistent with the previous managers’ failure to make 
these write-offs when they were necessary. This may allow the new CEO to attribute poor performance to 
its predecessors, support claims of being better CEO, and establish a low base for executive compensation 
tied to reported earnings. Recently, Hazarika et al. (2011) find that earnings management and forced 
turnover occurs in both firms with good and bad performance, and when the accruals work to inflate or 
deflate reported earnings. 
 
Hypotheses of study: This section begins with a brief summary of the Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) 
model. This model implies that managers, with greater job security concerns, will engage in income 
smoothing largely. Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) show that income smoothing to augment job security 
emerges in equilibrium if the following hypotheses are maintained. First, managers have non-monetary 
private benefits from supervising the firm. Second, the firm cannot deliver itself to a long-term motivation 
contract, so that bad performance may result in managers' dismissal, see for instance Murphy and 
Zimmerman (1993). Third, present earnings are more important than earlier earnings (information 
decay) in managers’ running evaluation. Cumulatively, these hypotheses imply that managers will 
increase their earnings in poor performance and save for the future in good performance in order to 
prolong their tenure. The first two hypotheses indicate that managers have an incentive to boost current 
earnings by relocate future earnings to the current period to diminish the risk of dismissal in the short 
term. Furthermore, this incentive increases as the level of current performance decreases. These two 
hypotheses signify that managers will increase current income by borrowing from future periods when 
needed, but they do not suggest that managers must shift current income for future periods when needed, 
which is also demand for income smoothing. This is the objective of the third hypothesis that current 
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earnings are more important than past earnings in managers’ running judgment. In other words, good 
past performance will not compensate for bad current performance because of information decline. This 
implies that managers are less interested with dismissal in good period; rather, they are motivated to 
save for future bad period by altering current earnings to future times to extend their tenure. In this 
paper, we re-examine some hypothesis by considering 271 US companies. The first hypothesis to test is, 
 
Hypothesis 1: The CEOs smooth earning according to current and future performance in order to 
lengthen their tenure. The CEOs may smooth earning by making income increasing or income 
decreasing. Therefore, to investigate these two cases, we subdivide our hypothesis on two other 
hypotheses. 
Precisely, we investigate whether CEOs borrow future earnings for the current period to prolong their 
tenure. In that case, COEs’ choose income increasing discretionary accruals when current performance is 
poor and future performance is good.  
 
Hypothesis (a): If the current performance is poor and the future performance is good, CEOs will be 
motivated to decrease the future earnings to the detriment of the current one in a purpose to lengthen 
their tenure. The second emitted hypothesis predicts that the CEOs can shift current earnings for a 
possible use in the future. They choose income decreasing discretionary accruals, when current 
performance is good and future performance is poor. 
 
Hypothesis (b): If the current performance is good and the future performance is poor, CEOs will be 
motivated to decrease the current earning by postponing them on the future period in order to lengthen 
their tenure.   
 
3. Methodology  
 
Data: The data sample is obtained from the list fortune 1000 and Forbes 200. We consider 271 
companies over the period 1993 to 2003, a period supposed to be sufficient to study the links between 
earning smoothing and job security. The annual accounting data are manually collected from annual 
reports 10 K. The job security data are taken from the circulars of information (proxy statement) which 
are due by virtue of the regulation 14a-3a of the American regulations on securities (the securities 
exchange act of 1934). The circulars of information are documents emitted to the shareholders, which 
contain information allowing them to make decisions informed during general assemblies. All the 
information concerning the job security (CEO’ tenure, the type of departure and ages) was taken from the 
section of the appointment of the directors. We divide the sample into 12 subgroups based on their sector 
activities and where each subgroup must have at least 20 firms. A two digit classification of SIC was used 
to get the 12 subgroups, see for instance Defond and Park (1997). We note also that financial sector (SIC 
6000 - 6999) and the regulated sector (4900 in 4999) was excluded based on their discretionary accruals 
that require a particular treatment. The following table gives the distribution of the sample by sector. 
 
Table 1: Sector-based distribution of the firms of the sample 
Sector 2 digit SIC Number Of firms 
Steel pipe and tube 33 20 
Miscellaneous fabricated metal product 34 23 
Electronic computer 35 27 
Telephone and telegraph apparatus 36 25 
Motor vehicle parts and accessories 37 23 
Surgical and medical instruments and apparatus 38 22 
Beverage 20 23 
Greeting card 27 21 
Industrial inorganic chemical 28 23 
Wholesale electrical apparatus and equipment wiring supplies 50 22 
Wholesale petroleum and petroleum product no bulk station 51 20 
Pharmaceutical preparation 73 22 
Total  271 
 
Variables: This subsection presents firstly the modified Jones model, as presented by Dechow et al. 
(1995) used to estimate the discretionary accruals, and secondly the approach used to evaluate the 
current and future performance, the measures of job security and control variables. 
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Dependent variable  (discretionary accruals): The discretionary accruals (DA) is estimated using the 
modified Jones model known to be the most used and efficient approach, see for example Dechow et al. 
(1995), Guay et al. (1996), and Ye (2007). The DA is measured as the residuals obtained by estimating the 
following regression using the least squared method, 
 
1 2 3
1 1 1 1
1
                                          (1)
it itit it
it
it it it it
REV ARTA PPE
A A A A
 
 
Wheree i indicates sample firm and t the time.  
 
TAit is the total accruals.  
Ait-1 is the logarithm of the total assets.  
REVit is the total annual revenues.   
ARit is the end of fiscal year accounts receivable.  
ΔREVit-ΔARit is the change in cash-basis revenue.  
PPEit is the end of fiscal year gross property, plant, and equipment. 
it  Are the residuals of the regression (1) considered as the measures of the earnings management 
obtained from the modified Jones model? The total accruals (TA ) are computed, as in many others 
empirical works, see for example Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) by  using 
the following expression, 
TAit= ΔCAit – ΔCLit – ΔCashit + ΔSTDit - Depit 
 
Here as in the previous eq. (1), i indicates sample firm and t the time. The variables ΔCAit, ΔCLit, ΔCashit, 
ΔSTDit, Depit are respectively change in current assets, change in current liabilities, change in cash and 
cash equivalents, change in debt included in current liabilities and depreciation and amortization 
expense.  
 
Independents variables: All independents variables used in the following descriptive and multivariate 
approaches are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Research Models: In order, to test the hypothesis H (a) and H (b) proposed in section 2, we use the 
following multivariate regression,  
0 1 -1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
. . 1 2
. . ( . )*( . )
t t t t
t t t t t it
Disc Accruals Disc Accruals Age Age Tenure Liv
Size Current Perf Future Perf Current Perf Future Perf
 
Where Disc. Accruals are the dependent variable estimated using the modified Jones (1995) model. The 
others variables are the independents variables defined and measured as in Table (2). The index i designs 
the firms and t the time. it  are the errors terms. 
 
4. Results  
 
Descriptive analysis: Descriptive statistics for all variables are given in Table 3. This table reports the 
mean, the standard deviation, the maximum, the minimum, the first quartile (Q1), the second quartile 
(Q2), and the third quartile (Q3). The discretionary accruals variable have a negative average (-0.299) 
with a standard deviation equal to 4.101. The second and third variables (current and future 
performance) behave similarly. Empirical results for the tenure and age 1 variables show that the average 
values are respectively equals to 9.456 and 56.428 years and their corresponding standard deviations are 
8.090 and 9.041. For the Leverage and firm size variables, the empirical mean of the debts ratio on total 
assets is equal to 0.784 and the average of the logarithm of total assets is equal to 20.888 with a standard 
deviation equal to 1.885. For the last variable, the age 2 which is a dummy variable, have an average of 
0.428 and a standard deviation of 0.573? This later result shows that the average of CEO whom old 
around 63 to 65 is 42.8%. 
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Table 2:  Variables Descriptions 
Variable Symbole Variable Masure 
Financial Variables 
Current  
Performance 
Current Perf To calculate the current performance of the company, 
we use the following formula2: 
current pre-amenaged  profit – net current average 
profit of the sample 
current pre-amenaged  profit= net current profits - 
discretionary accruals  
Future  
Performance 
Future Perf The future performance of the company, is calculated 
as follow3: 
Future pre-amenaged  profit – net future average 
profit of the sample 
Future pre-amenaged  profit= net future profits - 
discretionary accruals  
Variable of job Security 
Age 1 Age1  number of years 
Age 2 Age2 Takes the value 1 if the CEO is old around 63 to 65 
and 0 otherwise. 
Tenure Tenure Number of years in CEO position. 
Variable of control 
Firm size Size Log (total assets) 
Leverage Lev Total debts / total asset                                                                                           
Discretionary Accruals of 
the previous year 
-1. tDisc Accruals  The value of the discretionary accruals at date t-1. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
1th 
Quartile 
2th 
Quartile 
3th 
Quartile 
Discretionary accruals 2710 -0.299 4.101 -64.85 25.82 -0.1087 -0.028 0.036 
Current Performance 2710 0.550 0.498 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Future performance 2710 0.538 0.498 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Leverage 2710 0.784 3.886 0.0027 135.860 0.341 0.471 135.860 
Firm size 2710 20.888 1.885 13.567 27.42 19.799 21.140 22.026 
Tenure 2710 9.456 8.090 1.000 52.000 3.000 6.000 12.000 
Age 1 2710 56.428 9.041 28.000 89.000 52.000 57.000 61.000 
Age 2 2710 0.428 0.573 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
The behaviour of accruals according to the performance: We conduct the wilcoxon test and the 
Mann-Whitney U tests in order to compare on the one hand the results management between firms with 
current good performance and those with current poor performance. On the other hand, this test is also 
used to compare the discretionary accruals between firms with future good performance and that with 
future poor performance. Finally, we combine both types of performance to study the behaviour of 
accruals in purposes of job security. 
 
                                                          
2This difference was used by Defond and Parck (1997)  
3 We shall use as substitute real future pre-amenaged profit seen the not availability of the past forecasts, 
especially that these last ones can be slanted because we work on past data (Defond and Parck on 1997). 
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Wilcoxon test (see appendix Tables 4(a)-(b) and 5(a)-(b)): The wilcoxon statistics support the idea 
following that earning management is more intense in firms with current good (future good) 
performance than firms with current bad (future poor) performance. We deduct that when the current 
(future) performance is good. The CEOs find the sufficient margins to manage the earnings to leave in 
reserve for the future performance (or borrow for the current performance). 
 
Current performance. Future performance and the smoothing earning: We study the behavior of 
discretionary accruals within nine groups according to the state of the current and future performance. 
The behavior of accruals is summarized in the following table. 
 
Table 6:  Discretionary accruals by current and future performance 
Future performance  Current performance 
  Good Poor 
Good 
Mean 
Standard error 
Median 
N. Obs.  
-0.927 
6.687 
-0.08 
984 
0.104 
0.308 
0.03 
474 
Poor 
Mean 
Standard error 
Median 
N. Obs. 
-0.177 
0.397 
-0.077 
505 
0.187 
1.05 
0.048 
747            
 
The First compartment in table 6 corresponds to the case where companies are characterized by a good 
current and future performance. For these companies, the CEOs do not run a risk of dismissal. The second 
compartment corresponds to companies of the sample that are characterized by a current poor 
performance and a future good performance. For this kind of companies. The result shows that the CEOs 
increase earnings for the current year in the detriment of the future years by increasing the discretionary 
accruals in order to avoid the threat of dismissal. This result is confirmed by the average value (0.104) 
and the median value (0.03) of the discretionary accruals (positive). Indeed, from the 474 observations 
that form these companies there are 305 observations (65% of current poor-future good performance) 
that have a positive mean. The third compartment of the sample corresponds to companies with current 
good and future poor performances. We remark, for these companies, that the CEOs decrease earnings for 
the current year in order to increase the benefit for the future years by decreasing the discretionary 
accruals to avoid the threat of the dismissal. This result is in line with the negatives values of the mean 
and median, respectively equal to -0.177 and -0.077. The number (rate) of companies with negative mean 
and median is equal to 468 from the 505 that constitute the third subsample (92%). The last 
compartment corresponds to companies with weak current and future performances. The CEOs of these 
companies have no margin to smooth the earnings. However, the positive and negative proportions of the 
discretionary accruals are comparable to the proportions founded in compartments 2 and 3. 
Nevertheless, these results are not in line with the intuition of Fudenberg and Tirole (1995). 
 
The ventilation of the earning management and the job security according to the performance 
 
Case of companies with current good performance and with current poor performance: In this 
subsection, we are interested by the behaviour of the earning management and the job security according 
to current good performance and current bad performance cases. To do that, we have the discriminating 
function. The result of this estimation is reported in Table 7 below. Based on the result reported in table 7 
panel A, we have conducted a statistic test for equality in means between each variable for the two 
groups. The result of this t-stat test is reported in the last column of table 7 panel B. Only for the two 
variables discretionary accruals and firm size, the null hypothesis of equality in means is rejected. In 
addition to this descriptive statistics analysis, we use also the linear discriminating function (LDF) 
approach in order to check which variables can be used to discriminate between the two groups of poor 
and good performance. The results of the estimated coefficients of the discriminating function and their 
corresponding F-statistics are reported in columns 2-4 of Panel B. These results confirm those of 
descriptive statistics, see panel A and last column of panel B. results show that only the discretionary 
accruals and firm size variables have a significant power to discriminate between both groups. This joins 
the Wilcoxon test results. The discrimination analysis shows that job security variables are not significant. 
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Table 7: Discriminating analysis results according current performance 
Panel A    
State of the performance  Mean Std. dev. 
Poor Discretionary accruals  
Leverage 
Firm size 
Tenure 
Age 1 
0.155 
0.787 
20.801 
9.643 
56.552 
0.844 
5.505 
1.860 
9.590 
7.979 
 Number of observations 1221 
Good 
 
Discretionary accruals  
Leverage 
Firm size 
Tenure 
Age 1 
-0.672 
0.781 
20.959 
9.303 
56.327 
5.452 
1.625 
1.905 
8.564 
8.182 
 Number of observations 1489 
Total  Discretionary accruals  
Leverage 
Firm size 
Tenure 
Age 1 
-0.2998 
0.784 
20.888 
9.456 
56.428 
4.101 
3.886 
1.885 
9.041 
8.090 
Panel B 
 Discriminating function   F  test t-stat for equality in means 
Discretionary accruals  
Leverage 
Firm size 
Tenure 
Age 1 
0.917 
-0.019 
-0.349 
-0.009 
0.115 
27.614 
0.001 
4.686 
0.950 
0.522 
40.251 
1.153 
-16.506 
1.501 
1.277 
 
Case of companies with current good performance and with current poor performance: Our 
discriminating analysis is conducted according to future good performance and future bad performance 
to show if the earning management and job security differ between the two groups.  
 
Table 8: Discriminating analysis results according future performance 
Panel A 
State of the performance  mean Std. dev. 
Poor Discretionary accruals  
Leverage 
Firm size 
Tenure 
Age 1 
0.039 
0.709 
20.822 
9.658 
56.480 
0.868 
3.953 
1.851 
9.608 
8.126 
 Number of observations 1252 
Good 
 
Discretionary accruals  
Leverage 
Firm size 
Tenure 
Age 1 
-0.591 
0.848 
20.945 
9.283 
56.384 
5.517 
3.828 
1.913 
8.523 
8.061 
 Number of observations 1458 
Panel B 
 Discriminating function F test t-stat for equality in 
means 
Discretionary accruals  
Leverage 
Firm size 
Tenure 
Age 1 
0.883 
-0.238 
-0.329 
0.147 
-0.044 
16.061 
0.852 
2.853 
1.163 
0.096 
29.332 
-6.169 
-23.444 
3.035 
0.986 
 
103 
 
When looking at the means and the standard deviations in panel A and by conducting the same test of 
equality in means as in previous subsection. The results show that the variables: discretionary accruals, 
advantage, firm size and tenure can be used to discriminate between both groups. The result of the F-test 
reported in panel B of table 8 shows that only the discretionary accruals and the firm size have significant 
coefficients, which mean that only these two variables have a significant power to discriminate between 
the two groups. This result confirms those of Wilcoxon test. In the other hand, the difference in means for 
the job security variable is not significant when looking to the F statistic and significant if we consider the 
t-stat of equality in means. Indeed the average of the tenure in both groups is almost the same 
(approaches 10 years). This value is explained by the effect of the CEO’s entrenchment.  
 
Results of the multivariate model  
 
Check of the multicolinearity: To test for multicolinearity between the independent variables we use 
the Pearson correlation coefficients. Empirical results of the correlation coefficients are reported in table 
9 below. This table shows that all coefficients are smaller than 0.8 accepts between current and future 
performance. The Vifcolin test confirms the absence of multicolinearity between variables. All correlation 
coefficients are lower than 10%, and statistics test cannot reject the null hypothesis. In the following 
subsection, we adjust our estimation to take into account the presence of multicolinearity.  
 
Table 9: Pearson correlations and Vifcolin statistic results 
 Current Perf Future Perf Tenure Age1 Age2 Type.dep Lev size 
Current Perf 1        
Future Perf 0.958 1       
Tenure -0.015 -0.023 1      
Age1 -0.001 -0.002 0.546 1     
Age2 -0.005 -0.006 0.516 0.763 1    
Type.dep -0.16 -0.165 0.009 -0.089 -0.099 1   
Lev 0.041 0.034 -0.031 -0.071 -0.037 -0.010 1  
Size 0.025 0.029 -0.254 -0.036 -0.092 -0.056 -0.082 1 
Vifcolin 15.09 21.72 1.608 2.694 2.524 1.056 1.036 1.097 
 
Results of the estimation of the model: The results of the regression using SAS software are 
summarized in table 10 below. 
 
0 1 -1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 9
. . 1 2
. . ( . )*( . )
t t t
t t t t t t it
Disc Accruals Disc Accruals Age Age Tenure
Liv Size Current Perf Future Perf Current Perf Future Perf
 Table 10: Multivariate regressions results of Discretionary accruals on performance and control variables 
 Discretional accruals 
Independents Variables  Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept -0.2709 -2.80 
Disc. Accruals(t-1) 0.0387 13.65 
Age1 0.0007 0.57 
Age2 0.0014 0.09 
Tenure -0.0013 -1.55 
Lev 0.0156 0.84 
Size 0.0088 4.62 
Current perf  -0.0038 -21.36 
Future Perf 0.7244 16.86 
(Current perf)* (Future Perf) -0.0923 -12.68 
 
The discretionary accruals of the previous year have a positive significant coefficient. This result indicates 
that there is an earning smoothing influenced by previous manipulations. In addition, empirical results 
show that magnitude of CEOs accruals manipulations is a positive function of the size and advantage 
variables. Moreover, the current and future performance as well as their product is significant at a level of 
1% level. The current performance has a negative coefficient and the future performance has a positive 
coefficient. This implies that the current performance varies in the inverse sense of that of the 
discretionary accruals. While the future performance varies in the same sense of the discretionary   
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accruals. In other words, the increase of the discretionary accruals in the earning is associated with a bad 
(decline) current performance and a good (increase) future performance. On the other hand, the decrease 
of the discretionary accruals is associated with a current good performance and a future weak 
performance. The estimation shows that the variable "tenure" is statistically significant at a level of 10 % 
and it has a negative coefficient. This coefficient shows that the tenure varies in the opposite sense of that 
of the accruals. In a sense an increase of accruals is accompanied with a decrease of the tenure, by 
consequences the job security of the CEOs is affected. To avoid this situation, CEOs decrease the accruals, 
which will come along with a current good performance and a future bad performance. They will leave 
them in reserve to the detriment of current period to have the longest possible tenure. In summary, our 
results show that CEOs engage in earnings decreasing accruals, so they shift current earnings to future 
periods when current earnings is high and future earnings is low to lengthen their tenure. This confirms 
specially the descriptive analysis results and our second hypothesis. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) analytically show that income smoothing can arise in equilibrium if 
managers are concerned about job security. DeFond and Park (1997) proves that managers smooth 
income according to both current and future performance, which is consistent with the predictions of the 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) model. However, their results suffer from two limitations. First, DeFond and 
Park (1997) do not directly examine the relation between job security and income smoothing. Second, 
recent studies doubt about the validity of the inferences used in DeFond and Park (1997) because of their 
reliance on the backing out method of estimating discretionary accruals from earnings to measure 
current pre-managed earnings performance. This work presents contributions to the literature of the 
income smoothing and the job security. Indeed, it showed that the income smoothing is an effective 
instrument for the CEOs to lengthen their tenure. Our results prove that CEOs engage in earnings 
decreasing accruals, so they shift current earnings to future periods when current earnings is high and 
future earnings is low to lengthen their tenure. However, our study has some deficiencies, indeed, 
although the modified Jones model (Dechow et al, 1995) is the most used and the most successful model 
in the literature, other model such as that of Dechow et al. (2003) can be used to estimate accruals. In 
addition, future performance can be measured using analyst’s forecasts. However, the unavailability of 
the data prevented us from realizing such analysis. Other ways of researches that can extend this study is 
to introduce CEO compensation as a factor to test for job security. This can be done by examining if the 
CEO smoothes income to guarantee their good compensation. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 4(a): Mann-Whitney Test Ranks 
  Current Performance  
  N Mean rank Sum of rank 
Discretionary accruals Poor 1221 1920.13 2344474.00 
  Good 1489 892.50 1328931.00 
  Total 2710     
 
Table 4(b): The results of the Mann-Whitney (U) and Wilcox on (W) tests 
 Discretionary accruals** 
Mann-Whitney U 219626.000 
Wilcox on W 1328931.000 
Z -34.018 
P-value Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 
** Grouping Variable: Current performance  
 
Table 5(a): Mann-Whitney Test Ranks 
 Performance future N Mean rank Sum of rank 
 
Discretionary accruals  
  
Poor 1252 1515.48 1894354.00 
Good 1458 1216.48 1773632.00 
Total 2710     
 
Table 5(b): The results of the Mann-Whitney (U) and Wilcox on (W) tests 
  Discretionary accruals**  
Mann-Whitney U 710021.000 
Wilcox on W 1773632.000 
Z -9.921 
P-value Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 
** Grouping Variable: Future performance  
